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On why the traditional Advaitic resolution of 
jivanmukti is superior to the neo-Vedantic 
resolution 
Sakkapol Vachatimanont 
 
 The predicament of human existence and its 
resultant sufferings is one of the central issues in Indian 
philosophies. Further, one could say that Indian 
philosophies seeks to describe a metaphysics and a 
practice that would allow the individual to become 
liberated from the sufferings of normal human 
existence (known as moksa). A question that results 
when pondering the nature of liberation is that of 
whether liberation is possible whilst still embodied in 
this life. Indian philosophies compromises numerous 
schools of thought, so some schools would certainly 
find this notion of liberation whilst still embodied to be 
rather atrocious. One school which upholds this idea, 
known as jivanmukti, to be possible is that of the 
Advaita Vedanta school. One can further divide the 
Advaita Vedanta school into either those who espouse 
the traditional Advaitic stance or those who subscribe to 
the views of the Western influenced neo-Vedantas. This 
subdivision is agreed upon by most scholars as no real 
other third way present. Regardless, the concept of 
jivanmukti raises philosophical problems which need to 
be addressed. Chiefly, if liberated, why is one still in a 
body? The paper will commence with a discussion of 
the resolutions provided to answer the above problem 
as offered by the traditional Vedantas and from the neo-
Vedanta. It shall be seen that although the traditional 
Vedantic response is without its difficulties, it is still 
superior to the neo-Vedantic response, which causes the 
traditional Vedantic jivanmukti to fall into a pseudo-
egoism. This type of view espoused by the author of the 
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paper can be contrasted to most commentators, as they 
are usually full of praise for the accomplishments of the 
neo-Vedantas.   
 It is of the interest to the reader that a basic 
introduction to and explanation of the basic tenets of 
the Advaita Vedanta school is provided before a 
thorough discussion of the issue can commence.  
Vedanta literally translates to "the end of the Veda." 
The work itself refers to both the teaching of the 
Upanishads, the last treatise of the Vedas, and to the 
knowledge of the ultimate meanings. These ultimate 
meanings concern man's relationship to the existence of 
brahman [the unchanging, infinite, immanent and 
transcendent reality that is the Divine Ground of all 
being] with the world and to his own inner self. In this 
school of thought, liberation (moksa, mukti) is release 
from bondage to the cycle of transmigatory existence 
(samsara). The reason why embodied beings 
experience this world of phenomenal appearances is 
because of ignorance (avidya) of their true nature. 
Avidya causes desire-filled actions (karma) which 
continually binds people to samsara. The only way one 
can gain release is through achieving immediate 
knowledge (vidya jnana) of the indivisible, pervasive, 
unchanging and self-luminous reality called brahman. 
One will also understand that brahman is one’s true self 
(atman) and this self is not tied to the body or intellect. 
It is free from all limitations and sorrows. This type of 
knowledge arises not through devotions or works but 
through proper understanding of sacred texts.   
 It has already been noted there are present 
philosophical problems resulting from the jivanmukti 
concept, but it has not yet been formally explicated. 
The problems can be divided into two general 
categories. Those falling under Problem (a) can be 
viewed as thus: The notion of liberation as absence of 
suffering and sorrow (and thus embodiment) raises the 
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question of “If liberated, why is one still in a body ?”. 
Problem (b) is a bit longer and is thus:  To Advaitins, 
the body is a result of prior activity (karma), which is 
part of ignorance (avidya). Gaining knowledge of non-
dual brahman is said to destroy ignorance, and it should 
therefore bring immediate liberation (sadyomukti), 
annihilating all karma, including the body. Since the 
body does not cease when knowledge rises, ignorance 
of some form must remain. Thus, how can there be 
avidya post-avidya? This problem is rather serious 
because Advaitins largely accept that there is total 
opposition, rather than degrees of difference, between 
knowledge and ignorance. The analogy often exploited 
by the Advaitins is that of the opposition between 
darkness and light.  
 Utilizing one person to be representative of a 
particular viewpoint can often times be problematic. 
Nevertheless, this paper will be using the views of 
Sankara as representative of the traditional view of 
Advaita. The time of Sankara’s existence was around 
509-477 BCE.  Sankara believes that ignorance (avidya)  
is caused by seeing atman [the self] where self is not. It 
is necessary for discrimination to be developed in order 
to distinguish knowledge (jnana) from ignorance 
(avidya).  The importance of Sankara cannot be 
underestimated. During Sankara’s lifetime, Hinduism 
was in decline due to the influence of Buddhism and 
Jainism. As Eliot Deutsch notes:  
 
The existence of Vedic Dharma in India today is due 
to Sankara. The forces opposed to Vedic religion 
were more numerous and powerful at the time of 
Sankara than they are today. Still, single-handed, 
within a very short time, Sankara overpowered them 
all and restored the Vedic Dharma and Advaita 
Vedanta to its pristine purity in the land. The 
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weapon he used was pure knowledge and 
spirituality.1 
 
 Sankara proposes a separate solution to each of 
the two respective problems produced by the jivanmukti 
concept. In response to problem (a), concerning “if 
liberated, why is one still in a body”, Sankara asserts 
that one is “bodiless” while embodied, when one knows 
the self is not the body. In his commentary on the 
Brahmasutras I (of Badarayana) section 1.4, Sankara 
states that embodiment (sasarirtatva) is caused by 
ignorance, that is, identifying body and self. Thus, 
knowing that the eternal self is not and never was 
embodied shows that one is by nature eternally bodiless 
(asarira) and so the knower is in a sense asarira whilst 
living (in other words, “bodiless” while embodied). 
Bodilessness is complete detachment, not that of 
lacking a physical body. Evidence of these sentiments 
can be found in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad IV 
section 4.7, which states that the body is to a brahman-
knower like a cast-off skin is to a snake. In other terms, 
the body “disappears” for the knower (as in sleep or 
swoon), although the knower’s body doesn’t disappear. 
This appears to be a sound resolution, although there 
are some criticisms that can be put forth. What Sankara 
seems to be engaging in is that of trying to solve an 
ontological problem by giving a non-ontological answer. 
That is, his response is to treat the terms “embodied” 
and “bodiless” in a metaphorical manner which one can 
view as avoidance rather than a solution to the problem. 
Furthermore, the response appears to be retroactive. 
That is, it resolves the current issue by creating 
something that was not present earlier by seeing the 
problem in a psychological rather than treating it as a 
                                                
1 Elliot Deutsch, The essential Vedanta: a new source 
book of Advaita Vedanta (Bloomington, Ind: World Wisdom), p. 
76 
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metaphysical problem. Defenders of Sankara might 
concede that if one is looking for a “real” solution, one 
might justifiably be disappointed. However, those 
defenders of Sankara can put forth the idea that 
answers to questions should be judged in terms of how 
helpful they might be to the in terms of assisting the 
individual to seek liberation. 
 In response to the problem of how the karma-
based body can continue after brahman is known (in 
which all karma and ignorance is supposedly destroyed), 
Sankara posits three kinds of karma. Of the three kinds 
of karma, only two are removed by knowledge. The 
first is samcita karma, the accumulated mass of past 
karma. The second is agami karma, karma to be 
obtained in this life that would bear fruit in the future. 
After brahman knowledge, this karma will not bind, 
since this false notion of agency has disappeared (so it 
seems that “backsliding” is not possible). The third type 
is that of currently manifesting or prarabdha karma. 
Such karma, which produced the current body, is not 
destroyed by knowledge and must bear fruit before the 
fall of the body.  If it is not yet clear, the difference 
between samcita karma and prarabdha karma is that 
samcita karma is the effects of karma or actions that 
have not yet borne fruit [and can thus be expiated by 
our current actions such as penance, yoga, etc.] 
Parabdha karma are those that are already bearing fruit 
and being enjoyed by us now [such as our sex, 
parentage, etc.] and those karma or actions that we are 
committing now, which will bear fruit in future births.  
 Yet, the problem remains: how can knowledge 
destroy some, but not all, karma (and why the 
inexperienced rather than the partially experienced 
karma)?  Furthermore, if the immediate state of being 
bodiless does not occur, why would it occur eventually? 
If a little delay in liberation occurs, then why would not 
a lot of delay then? 
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Sankara’s interpretation of Chandogya Upanisad VI. 
Section 14.2 provides an answer. The text in the 
Chandogya Upanisad itself states that “the delay in 
final release is only as long as one is not free2”. Andrew 
Fort explains that “Sankara asserts that this means there 
is delay in attaining the self as long as an ignorant 
embodied person enjoys the (already commenced) fruits 
of karma. Then, utilizing the Chandogya Upanisad 
terminology, he makes a crucial distinction, between 
‘knowing Brahman’, which is immediate and happens 
in the body, and ‘attaining Brahman’, which is 
simultaneous with release from the body (but delayed 
as long as parabdha karma manifests) 3”. Therefore, 
Sankara argues that final release (as opposed to mere 
liberation) happens at the time the body drops away, not 
when knowledge rises. The analogy most commonly 
employed to explain the continuance of the mukta’s 
body due to prarabdha karma is that of the continued 
whirling of a potter’s wheel (even after the potter has 
left) or the continued flight of an arrow after the initial 
impetus of the shot. The body, wheel and arrow 
continue for a time due to their momentum, but 
gradually and inevitably they will come to rest. 
Nonetheless, one can find a number of problems with 
the analogies. The most serious objection is that the 
bow and arrow and the rotating potter’s wheel are, in 
the examples, real things in a real world. However, it is 
the case that after one gains knowledge, one realizes 
that the body (and arrow and wheel) are illusions and 
were never really connected with the Self. A real thing 
cannot be analogous to an unreal imagining.  
                                                
2 Max Muller, trans., The Upanisads (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1964) p. 98 
3 Andrew O. Fort, Jivanmukti in Transormation: Embodied 
Liberation  in Adaita and Neo-Vedanta. (Albany: State Univesity 
of New York Press, 1998) p. 67 
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           One can still object that the embodied person’s 
parabdha karma, even if only a trace of avidya, is still 
ignorance and one possessing ignorance cannot be 
completely liberated. Furthermore, one can ask: How 
can knowledge have two natures simultaneously -both 
destroying and not destroying ignorance? The primary 
response that Sankara gives is that ignorance itself (in 
the form of parabdha karma) does not remain, only 
samskara (a memory) of ignorance abides. This 
impression alone causes the body to remain, even after 
all karma is destroyed. The analogy most often used to 
explain this is that of the trembling (equivalent to 
samskara) that continues even after the cessation of fear 
(equivalent to avidya), generated by mistaking a rope 
for a snake. When one is aware of the truth, fear (which 
is the cause of the trembling) ceases, but trembling 
(which is a mere effect) continues for a little while. It is 
inevitable and will gradually lessen over time. 
Analogously, when one gains the highest truth, 
ignorance (which is the cause of the body) ceases but 
the body (a mere effect) continues for a short while and 
then inevitably falls. 
The commentator Vimuktatman disagrees with 
this analogy, as it is his opinion that there are no 
samskaras without avidya. He felt that while both the 
impressions and ignorance (their locus) form the body 
(the essential nature) of ignorance, fear and trembling 
are not the body of the snake/rope and so it is not a 
good example. That is, the appearance of the snake is 
based on ignorance itself (and not a samskara) and 
when ignorance ceases, the rope-based illusion of the 
snake will never rise again.  There are also quite a few 
(too much to cover in this paper) other attempts to 
clarify and resolve the issue. Nevertheless, the 
consensus is that those adhering to the traditional 
Advaita school are left with the following quandary: 
either samskaras are avidya (thus the embodied one is 
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not a perfect knower) or they are not (thus should not 
cause the ignorance-based body to continue). 
 Despite there not being a staunch resolution 
provided by the traditional Advaitins, it will still be 
argued that it is superior to the Neo-Vedanta resolution. 
This is because, as the author of this paper will 
subsequently show, the Neo-Vedanta resolution 
introduces an unwanted element of egoism into the 
traditional view of the jivanmukti.  Before defining the 
Neo-Vedantas, it is necessary to first understand the 
importance of the correspondence between India and 
the West. This is of importance because of the impact 
and influence of the interaction with the West has had 
on the Neo-Vedantas. In the book India and Europe: An 
Essay in Understanding by Wilhelm Halbfass , it is 
stated that “the modern encounter of India and Europe 
was initiated and sustained by the West, and that India 
had no choice but to respond to this unprecedented, 
pervasive penetration 4”.  As a result of colonialism by 
the British, many Indian thinkers felt a need to respond 
to Western critiques that the Indian civilization was 
“backwards”. Mr. Halbfass further believes that western 
thought has become so influential in India that even 
when challenged, it is often presupposed. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Halbfass also believes that the modern West’s 
“overcoming” of India does not necessarily entail the 
superseding of Indian thought. 
 Indeed, those who write about and see 
themselves as part of Sankara’s Advaita tradition have 
certainly felt the impact of the West. These 
thinkers/scholars are referred to as the “Neo-Vedantas” 
and they are “..part of a tradition based on the 
Upanisads and Sankra’s nondualist interpretation 
thereof, and that these figures are participating in and 
                                                
4 William Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998) p.78 
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contributing to a new understanding of this Vedanta 
tradition, one influenced by Western premises and 
categories (imposed and chosen), which include 
humanistic globalism, the importance of egalitarian 
ethics, and a focus on psychological experience 5“.   
 As was the case with employing Sankara to 
represent the traditional Advaitic view, Swami 
Vivekananda (1863-1902) will be considered 
representative of the neo-Vedanta view. As Mr. Fort 
notes: “The modern thinker who has greatly influenced 
all later members of the neo-Vedanta lineage on a wide 
range of topics is Swami Vivekanada”. Like many later 
neo-Vedantins, he was trained in English speaking 
missionary schools, read widely in Western literature 
and philosophy (and read many “Hindu” texts first in 
translation), and traveled extensively in the West. He 
made quite the groundbreaking appearance in 1893 in 
Chicago at the World Parliament of Religion. It was 
noted that Swami Vivekanada addressed the assembly 
of seven thousand people starting with the words: 
"Sisters and Brothers of America...", and the whole 
audience went into inexplicable rapture with standing 
ovation and clapping that lasted for more than three 
minutes. He also endorsed Western values such as 
rationalism, tolerance, and social progress. Of course, it 
would be wrong to say that he was simply “Western”. 
He was familiar with and claimed as authoritative, 
Vedantic texts and Indian philosophical thought in 
Sanskrit. Indeed, he was critical of Western 
individualism and materialism, and hoped to conquer 
the world with Vedantic “spritiuality”.  
 The neo-Vedantic resolution to the problems 
generated by the jivanmukti focuses on a more practical 
point. They explain that jivanmukti exist so that so that 
one can learn from enlightened teachers, who 
                                                
5 Fort, p. 130 
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compassionately remain in a body to assist ignorant 
humans. It should be noted that Sankara also 
highlighted this point, though not giving it the impetus 
and emphasis that the neo-Vedanta do. All of this 
makes sense given that one could not know about (or 
reach) liberation unless enlightened teachers existed.  
The general problem of how to reconcile the utter 
transcendence of enlightenment with the need to give 
the enlightened being a role in society has been present 
for a long time in Indian (specifically Hindu and 
Buddhist) thought. It is important to recognize that this 
philosophical tension was understood by the 
philosophers of the tradition, and that it was driven by 
sociological as well as philosophical considerations. It 
should also be considered that the teacher (guru) has 
always maintained a utmost important role in Indian 
philosophical thought. Furthermore, it can be said that 
these teachers could not exist if the body falls 
immediately after knowledge. If one were to subscribes 
to the all or nothing view of vidya, then this would be 
the case.  
However, everyday experience tends to provide 
examples of teachers without perfect knowledge 
helping those with even less knowledge.  The modern 
neo-Vedantins make much of the role of enlightened 
teachers and qualify a further rationale for the 
jivanmukti’s continued existence: to provide selfless 
social service to the suffering. Indeed, Vivekananda 
often asserted that Vedanta and social service are 
completely compatible. In his opinion, spiritual and 
social reform should happen simultaneously. 
Manomohan Ganguly notes about Vivekenanda: 
“Reacting in part to criticism of Hindu caste 
boundedness (and general ‘lack of ethics’) by Christian 
missionaries, he argued strenuously for ‘spiritual 
harmony’, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and 
held that such ideas were Vedantic because Vedanta 
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teaches the ‘oneness of all’ and that ‘you are your 
brother’6“.Vivekenanda further claimed that when one 
feels oneness in human nature and with the universe, 
one will then “rush forth to express it….This expression 
of oneness is what we call love and sympathy, and it is 
the basis of all our ethics and morality7 ”.Vivekenanda 
believes this is summed up in the Vedanta philosophy 
by the celebrated aphorism Tat Tvam Asi (which 
translates into That Thou Art). This means ones soul 
and body are one with all others, and in “hurting 
anyone you hurt yourself; in loving anyone you love 
yourself 8”. Serving others therefore becomes a form of 
both spiritual training and love of self.  
 One could take issue with the neo-Vedanta 
resolution by arguing that such a resolution loses the 
emphasis on devaluation of everyday existence 
(vyavahara) in Advaita thought.  If the liberated being 
realizes the world of duality lacks ultimate reality, this 
being would not necessarily show any concern for 
others in this realm (even by teaching them). It is of 
note to see the counter-argument here: from the 
perspective of those not enlightened, the world seems to 
be real and such individuals consequently 
suffer.However, the scholar R.C. Pandeya argues that 
Advaitic views on non-duality lead to a transcendence 
of Western-style social ethics. Mr. Pandeya makes the 
case that while the body and the social realm persist for 
a jivanmukti, they know they are not the highest truth. 
In this view, liberation brings a thorough detachment 
from everyday existence, with no mandatory duties. 
Looking out for the welfare of others implies that one 
must attend to the world of duality and the “others” 
there to care for. Not only is concern for others 
                                                
6 Manomohan Ganguly, The Swami Vivekananda: a study 
(Calcutta: Contemporary Publishers, 1962) p. 98 
7 ibid.  
8 ibid., p. 99 
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ultimately based on delusion, but concern can itself 
become an attachment.  
 But, that is not the gravest issue to result from 
the resolution proposed. One can make a strong 
argument that the neo-Vedanta resolution entails that 
jivanmukti in the traditional Advaitic view is an egoist. 
Egoism makes the basic claim that the individual self is 
the motivating moral force and the end of moral action. 
This is because creating a rationale for jivanmukti to 
perform social service implies jivanmukti in the 
traditional view do not show concern for others. That is, 
the quest to be a mutki (and the subsequent actions of 
the mukti) in the traditional Advaita could certainly be 
viewed as wholly self-centered and self-motivated as a 
result of the neo-Vedantic resolution. 
 One could certainly make the argument that 
jivanmukti in the traditional Vedanta conception was 
always an egoist, and that the neo-Vedanta resolution 
has rightly brought this point to the foreground. 
However, this argument is flawed as there is an 
important distinction that has to be made. The neo-
Vedantins are engaging in western constructions while 
the traditional Vedantins stay within the framework of 
Indian philosophies. It is not fair for terms such as 
“egoist” to be applied in the traditional Vedanta 
framework. If one wishes to engage in constructions 
within the traditional framework, one must be 
respectful and use only those constructions available 
within the framework. As the neo-Vedantins engage in 
Western constructions, one can say it is fair for them to 
be accountable for the implications of what their 
constructions entail. That is, western constructions can 
only be justly applied to the traditional Advaitic 
framework through the implications of another 
framework using western constructions. 
           The traditional Vedantic resolution, despite 
being somewhat flawed and incomplete, is still superior 
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to the neo-Vedantic resolution, which causes jivamukti 
in the traditional Advaita conception  to fall into egoism. 
Building on the previous statement, a grander sentiment 
that can be derived is that of trying to oppose the 
positive remarks most commentators have lavished 
upon the neo-Vedantas. The author of this paper most 
certainly appreciates that all religious traditions – 
whether broad groupings like “Christian” and “Hindu” 
or narrower ones like “Episcopalian” and “Advaita”- 
are products of a never-ending process of assimilation 
and integration of concepts from a variety of sources. 
There is much to be appreciated about neo-Vedantins 
such as Swami Vivekanada who are at the forefront of 
syncretizing and harmonizing past and present, east and 
west. Mr. Fort notes correctly that “they are 
undertaking two difficult and important tasks: that of 
self-definition and identity forging and that of 
meditating between and trying to integrate two (at least) 
very different cultures. One could fairly say that 
reinterpreting and fining new meaning in one’s tradition 
is not only a right, but a duty9”. It is not the case that 
those who engage in these types of enterprises should 
be condemned, but rather caution should be given to 
those who are disrespectful to the tradition they claim 
to be a part of. That, as this paper has claimed, is what 
the neo-Vedantas have accomplished. But perhaps more 
importantly, this paper introduces to the reader not 
familiar with Indian philosophies to the sort of tensions 
that have long been present in Indian philosophies. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                
9 Fort, p. 132 
